power to behold a conflict so vitally important to their neighbors without the sensibility and sympathy which naturally belong to such a case. It has been the steady purpose of this government to prevent that feeling leading to excess, and it is very gratifying to have it in my power to state, that so strong has been the sense, throughout the whole community, of what was due to the character and obligations of the nation, that few examples of a contrary kind have occurred.

The distance of the colonies from the parent-country, and the great extent of their population and resources, gave them advantages which it was anticipated at a very early period it would be difficult for Spain to surmount. The steadiness, consistency, and success with which they have pursued their object, as evinced more particularly by the undisputed sovereignty which Buenos Ayres has so long enjoyed, evidently give them a strong claim to the favorable consideration of other nations. These sentiments on the part of the United States, have not been withheld from other powers, with whom it is desirable to act in concert. Should it become manifest to the world that the efforts of Spain to subdue those provinces. will be fruitless, it may be presumed that the Spanish government itself will give up the contest. In producing such a determination, it cannot be doubted that the opinions of friendly powers who have taken no part in the controversy will have their merited influence.-Williams, Statesman's Manual, I., 415-416.

1820, Oct. 2.

SECRETARY ADAMS TO STRATFORD CANNING.

Besides the two broad and decisive reasons which had been alleged, there were others, which it was best in candor to mention. The first was the general extra-European policy of the United States-a policy which they had always pursued as best suited to their own interests and best adapted to harmonize with those of Europe. This policy had also been that of Europe, which had never considered the United States as belonging to her system. The European alliance, consisting of the five principal powers, had, since the overthrow of the French revolutionary domination, regulated the affairs of all Europe without ever calling the United States to their consultations. It was best for both parties that they

should continue to do so; for if the United States should become a member of the body, they would even now be a power entitled to great influence, and in a very few years must become a first-rate power in the league. They would bring to it some principles not congenial to those of the other members, and those principles would lead to discussions tending to discord rather than to harmony.-John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, V., 182.

1820, Nov. 14.

MONROE'S FOURTH ANNUAL MESSAGE.

No facts are known to this government to warrant the belief that any of the powers of Europe will take a part in the contest; whence it may be inferred, considering all circumstances which must have weight in producing the result, that an adjustment will finally take place on the basis proposed by the colonies. To promote that result by friendly counsels with other powers, including Spain herself, has been the uniform policy of this government.-Williams, Statesman's Manual, I., 422.

1821, Mar. 4.

MONROE'S SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

This contest was considered, at an early stage, by my predecessor, a civil war, in which the parties were entitled to equal rights in our ports. This decision, the first made by any power, being formed on great consideration of the comparative strength and resources of the parties, the length of time, and successful opposition made by the colonies, and of all other circumstances on which it ought to depend, was in strict accord with the law of nations.-Williams, Statesman's Manual, I., 428.

1821, Dec. 3. MONROE'S FIFTH ANNUAL MESSAGE.

It has long been manifest that it would be impossible for Spain to reduce these colonies by force, and equally so that no conditions short of their independence would be satisfactory to them. It may therefore be presumed, and it is earnestly hoped, that the government of Spain, guided by enlightened and liberal councils, will find it to comport with its interests, and due to its magnanimity, to terminate this exhausting controversy on that basis. To promote this result, by friendly counsel with the government of Spain, will be the

object of the government of the United States.-Williams, Statesman's Manual, I., 439.

1822, Mar. 8. MONROE'S SPECIAL MESSage.

The provinces belonging to this hemisphere are our neighbors, and have, successively, as each portion of the country acquired its independence, pressed their recognition by an appeal to facts not to be contested, and which they thought gave them a just title to it. . . . When we regard, then, the great length of time which this war has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor of the provinces, the present condition of the parties, and the utter inability of Spain to produce any change in it, we are compelled to conclude that its fate is settled, and that the provinces which have declared their independence, and are in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognized. . . . Nor has any authentic information been recently received of the disposition of other powers respecting it. A sincere desire has been cherished to act in concert with them in the proposed recognition, of which severai were some time past duly apprized; but it was understood that they were not prepared for it. The immense space between those powers, even those which border on the Atlantic, and these provinces make the movement an affair of less interest and excitement to them than to us.-Williams, Statesman's Manual, I., 484–485.

1823, May 13. MINISTER GALLATIN TO CHATEAUBRIAND. The United States would undoubtedly preserve their neutrality, provided it was respected, and avoid every interference with the politics of Europe. Even in the questions connected with South America they had not interfered, and, although their wishes were not doubtful, they had neither excited nor assisted the Spanish colonies. But I had every reason to believe that, on the other hand, they would not suffer others to interfere against the emancipation of America. If France was successful in her attack on Spain, and afterward attempted either to take possession of some of her colonies or to assist her in reducing them under their former yoke, I was of opinion that the United States would oppose every undertaking of this kind. Albert Gallatin, Writings, II., 271.

1823, June 11. JEFFERSON TO MONROE.

With Europe we have few occasions of collisions, and these, with a little prudence and forbearance, may be generally accommodated. Of the brethren of our own hemisphere, none are yet, or for an age to come will be, in a shape, condition, or disposition to war against us. And the foothold which the nations of Europe had in either America is slipping from under them, so that we shall soon be rid of their neighborhood. Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us.— Thomas Jefferson, Writings, VII., 288.

1823, July 17. SECRETARY ADAMS TO THE RUSSIAN

Baron Tuyl came.

MINISTER.

I told him specially that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer sub-. jects for any new European colonial establishments.—John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, VI., 163.

1823, July 22. SECRETARY ADAMS TO MINISTER RUSH.

The Independence of the South American nations and of Mexico. Those independent nations will possess the rights incident to that condition, and their territories will, of course, be subject to no exclusive right of navigation in their vicinity, or of access to them by any foreign nation.

A necessary consequence of this state of things will be, that the American Continents, henceforth, will no longer be subject to colonization. Occupied by civilized, independent nations, they will be accessible to Europeans and each other on that footing alone.-Register of Debates, 1825-26, II., Pt. 2,

p. 31.

1823, Nov. 7, 15, 25, 26. ADAMS'S ACCOUNT OF THE CABINET MEETINGS.

I remarked that the communications recently received from the Russian Minister, Baron Tuyl, afforded, as I thought, a

| very suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture of Great Britain. It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war.

This idea was acquiesced in on all sides.

Calhoun is perfectly moon-struck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says the Holy Allies, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and all South America to the Spanish dominion.

I did not deny that they might make a temporary impression for three, four, or five years, but I no more believe that the Holy Allies will restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent than that the Chimborazo will sink beneath the ocean.

. . . Mr. Wirt made a question far more important, and which I had made at a much earlier stage of these deliberations. It was, whether we shall be warranted in taking so broadly the ground of resistance to the interposition of the Holy Alliance by force to restore the Spanish dominion in South America. It is, and has been, to me a fearful question. It was not now discussed; but Mr. Wirt remarked upon the danger of assuming the attitude of menace without meaning to strike, and asked, if the Holy Alliance should act in direct hostility against South America, whether this country would oppose them by war. My paper and the paragraph would certainly commit us as far as the Executive constitutionally could act on this point; and if we take this course, I should wish that a joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress should be proposed and adopted to the same purport.

If, then, the Holy Allies should subdue Spanish America, however, they might at first set up the standard of Spain; the ultimate result of their undertaking would be to recolonize them, partitioned out among themselves. Russia might take California, Peru, Chili; France, Mexico—where we know she has been intriguing to get a monarchy under a Prince of the House of Bourbon, as well as at Buenos Ayres. And Great Britain, as her last resort, if she could not resist this course of things, would take at last the island of Cuba for her share of