state, and in a great degree the happiness of its members. How important then to fence round and vigilantly guard this fruitful nursery of valuable plants; to enrich it, that its productions may be healthy and vigorous, so that when they shall be transplanted, they may exhibit the beauty and order of cultivation, instead of the wildness and irregularity of nature, or the sickliness and deformity of neglect.

I pass to some observations on the nature of jurisprudence, and its different character in different periods of our civil history, in order to account for the omission of it, until this period as a branch of publick education.

In the rude stages of every suciet, the laws are simple and clear, with few objects to operate upon, requiring little knowledge to comprehend and little learning to explain them. As natural law or reason, is in such circumstances almost the only code, and this too, without the refinement which more advanced stages require, the man of superiour mind without technical skill, is the patron and advocate of his neighbour, and the best moralist is perhaps the best lawyer of his circle.

For the first century of our history, we learn little of law and lawyers, but the simplicity of one, and the insignificancy of the other.

The profession was probably followed by men of low minds and lower reputation, whose efforts were limited to the mechanical drudgery of the craft, by which they were able to outwit their more simple neighbours, and create for themselves estates, at the expense of their reputation. In all periods of society, those who practise the law without a knowledge of its principles, are the most mischievous, as well as the most degraded class of the community.

That this was the character of the practitioners of that day, may be gathered from an examination of our early records, and from the historical fact, that they were stigmatized by the colonial legislature as "usual and common attornies," and, as such, were contemptuously rendered ineligible into the councils of the colony. The profession of the law was undoubtedly then considered odious, and jurisprudence was probably unknown as a science.

Possibly some few of a higher cast of character, attended the superiour tribunals; but, at a time, when a classical education and law learning were not deemed essential qualifications for a judge, it may be supposed, that those who served

at the bar were but little distinguished by scientifick attainments. And it was not until after the charter of king William in 1692, that professed lawyers, were advanced to the seats of justice.

Those were days without doubt of quibble and chicane, when the spirit of law was sacrificed to its letter, and when the people ensnared by unintelligible forms, abhorred a system which would seem to them a mysterious juggle, calculated to hoodwink justice, and to enable the subtle and unprincipled to prey upon the simple and ignorant.

So little reliance was placed upon the knowledge or the honour of those who practised at the bar, that the legislature, at a later period, again interposed, and by a formal act, required that the attorney who should furnish his client with a defective writ, should supply him with another without an additional fee.

In such a state of things, law could not be deemed a science, and a proposition to teach it in the college, would probably have been received with as much horrour, as a scheme to instruct in magick or the black art. The profession had not risen above the character of attorneys or scriveners, and a scientifick course of study would have been as irksome, as it was wholly useless.

In this profession, as in the others which are dignified with the epithet of learned, empiricism first seizes the ground which is afterwards occupied by literature and talent. It is only when the society is enlarged and improved, and its members become intelligent and informed, that bold and ignorant pretenders give place to the skilful and scientifick; and it is not until then, that a specifick course of education is deemed requisite.

I have spoken now of the earliest part of our history, when legislation was limited to few objects, and those in present contemplation of inconsiderable importance.

It is true, our ancestors brought with them that complex mass of juridical wisdom, the common law of England, which to understand, required no little diligence and research, but they seem to have brought it rather as a store for future use than for immediate application.

They legislated for themselves, and their minute attention to the existing wants of a young and poor community, almost superseded the use of the common law.

It was only when property became separate and valuable, and commerce had begun to polish the rough face of affairs, or when their civil and political rights were brought into jeopardy, that the invaluable principles of that venerable code excited attention and commanded the reverence of the community.

But when this favourable change had taken place; although jurisprudence undoubtedly assumed a higher rank, yet, from the silence of history, and the utter want of biographical notice of eminent jurists, we may conclude, that until a few years before the revolution, law was considered rather as a trade than a science, and its professors viewed as cunning artificers rather than as profound jurists.

The only name handed down in the first century of our short but interesting story, as distinguished for its connexion with the law, is that of Read, who about the year 1750, vindicated with earnestness and ability the rights and interests of his country. The practitioner may yet, by repairing to his manuscript of forms, find the name of Read to many well digested precedents, and there is none before him to assist us in obtaining a juridical history of our country.

The first period, however, in which jurisprudence seems to have taken an exalted rank, and demanded of its professors elevated character and respectable learning, was that which immediately preceded the revolution.

Without doubt, the approaching dismemberment of the colonies from the parent country, had enlarged the minds and invigorated the faculties of the lawyers of that day, for we always find that a great political crisis produces extraordinary efforts of the human understanding.

The constant claim of prerogative on one side, and privilege on the other, required a knowledge of the rights and duties of the subject in those, who presented themselves for royal patronage or popular favour.

Profound discussions of the principles of free governments, the duty of submission and the right of resistance, sharpened the faculties and exercised the wits of the most distinguished lawyers, to which class of the community these discussions were almost entirely left.

The nature of the social compact, the extent and true object of political power, the inalienable rights of man, the questionable authority of kings, and the before unquesVol. III. No. 7. 3

tioned supremacy of Parliament, had become fashionable topicks of debate. Learning of all kinds, especially political, moral, and juridical, was necessary, in order to support with reputation, the conflict between contending parties.

The publick mind was strained to an unnatural avidity for learned essays, and profound disquisitions; and the Gazettes of that day contain abundant proof of the historical, political and professional knowledge of the popular and prerogative lawyers. Otis, Adams, the Sewalls, Trowbridge, the Quincys, honoured the profession of which they were distinguished members; and it cannot be doubted that the law was then deemed a science, worthy the most enlighted minds to learn, and honourable for the most dignified institution to teach.

The troubles and derangements occasioned by the war, and the distress and poverty which ensued, prevented that regular advancement in jurisprudence, which so respecíable a beginning had promised, but after a few years of retrograde rather than advancing movement; a new galaxy of jurists, chiefly sons of Harvard, arose to shed lustre upon their profession, and claim for it an elevated rank among the sciences.

I need only speak of the dead, to prove, that profound wisdom, learning, classical taste and philosophical research, are among the essential requisites and ornaments of a finished legal character.

Cushing, Dana, Lowell, Strong, Sedgwick, Parsons and Sewall, would have been honoured in any country and in any times. To a familiar knowledge of our municipal regulations, most of them added an extensive acquaintance with other sciences, and the law as understood and administered by them, was a comprehensive system of human wisdom, derived from the nature of man in his social and civil state, and founded on the everlasting basis of natural justice and moral philosophy.

The reputation of the profession is still pursued by a succession of elevated minds, who, catching and improving the light which has emanated from the brilliant luminaries of snother hemisphere, distribute its rays over their own country, and will banish for ever the effects of that dark and gloomy reign of ignorance and chicane, which disgraced the early period of our juridical history.

Well may the law now be denominated a science, and deemed worthy of a place in this University, for it embraces every thing most interesting to the human mind, except its future and eternal destiny.

It prescribes the duties and ascertains the rights of the citizen, sets limits to the powers of government, gives redress for wrongs, security to possessions, safety to the reputation, and tranquillity to the body politick.

It encourages industry, by guarding its fruits, promotes enterprize by protecting its gains; watches over the nuptial state, binds together parent and child, and establishes the relation of master and servant.

It enforces the performance of contracts, or punishes their breach, regulates the transfer of property, and provides for its transmission to remote posterity.

It presides over the morals of the State by demanding the instruction of youth, and it has respect to a future world, by establishing the worship of God.

It assumes also the character of an avenger, restraining the wicked, punishing the guilty, and depriving of liberty, estate and life.

These are the principal features of municipal law; which is only one, though the most important branch of jurisprudence.

But this comprehensive science looks beyond the territory over which it immediately reigns, and establishes connexions with distant communities, breathing war or peace, as the interests of its subjects may require, fixing rules of conduct upon the ocean, and prescribing bounds to the exercise of power in distant regions. This is the substance of publick law, or the law of nations.

A science like this, is worthy to be taught, for it cannot be understood without instruction; it should be admitted into fellowship with its sister sciences, for like theirs, its ends are noble. Its fundamental and general principles should be a branch of liberal education, in every country, but especially in those where freedom prevails, and where every citizen has an equal interest in its preservation and improvement. Justice ought therefore to be done to the memory of Royall, whose prospective wisdom, and judicious liberality, provided the means of introducing to the University the study of the law. Let us hope, that the