We beg leave therefore, by way of general summary of our remarks, to observe in conclusion-that the object of the Peace Society is in our opinion more worthy than any other to engage the attention of a benevolent and enlightened mind-that much may certainly be done towards effecting this object, and that the ultimate attainment of it is by no means to be despaired of-and that such associations are among the most powerful means that can be employed towards producing these desirable effects. ART. III. A course of legal study respectfully addressed to the Balti THE great progress which has been made in mathematical and physical science during the two last centuries, has attracted the attention not only of philosophers, but of men of business. So intimately indeed bas this progress connected itself with the immediate wants and comforts of mankind, that it could scarcely escape the most careless observer. But the progress of moral, political, and juridical science, during the same period, though less perceptible to the common eye, is not less wonderful; and has quite as much contributed to the improvement of the human race, and to the developement and security of their most important rights and interests. Few persons, indeed, are sufficiently aware how forcible, though silent, is the operation of laws, upon our manners, habits and feelings; and how much of our happiness depends upon a uniform and enlightened administration of publick justice. Whatever of rational liberty and security to private rights and property is now enjoyed in England, and in the United States, may in a great degree be traced to the principles of the common law, as it has been moulded and fashioned from age to age by wise and learned judges. Not that the common law in its origin or early stages was peculiarly fitted for these purposes, for the feudal system, with which it originated, or at least became early incorporated, was a system in many respects the very reverse; but that it has had the advantage of expanding with the improvements of the age, and of continually enlarg ing itself by an adoption of those maxims of civil right, which by their intrinsick justice and propriety commend themselves to the bosoms of all men. The narrow maxims of one age have not been permitted to present insurmountable obstacles to the improvements of another, but have become gradually obsolete or confined to a very insignificant range. If it were not beside our present purpose we might illustrate these remarks by calling the attention of our readers to the fact, that since the reign of queen Elizabeth, nearly the whole system of equity has been created; and that the commercial contracts, which form so great a portion of the business of our courts, were before that period either wholly unknown, or at the most, but very imperfectly understood. In respect to insurance, we may almost say that the law has grown up within the latter half of the eighteenth century. Previous to the time of Lord Mansfield, there are but few cases in the reports, which are entitled to much respect either for their sound interpretation of principles or general applicability. It is to his genius, liberality, learning, and thorough understanding of the maritime jurists of the continent, of Cleirac, and Roccus, and Straccha, and Santema, and Loccenius, and Caseregis and Valin, and to his ardent attachment to the equitable doctrines of the civil law, that we are chiefly indebted for that beautiful and rational system, which now adorns this branch of the common law. The doctrine of bailments too (which lies at the foundation of the law of shipments) was almost struck out at a single heat by Lord Holt,* who had the good sense to incorporate into the English code, that system which the text and the commentaries of the civil law had already built up on the continent of Europe. What remained to give perfect symmetry and connexion to all the parts of that system, and to refer it to its principles, has been accomplished in our times by the incomparable essay of Sir William Jones, a man, of whom it is difficult to say, which is most worthy of admiration, the splendour of his genius, the rareness and extent of his acquirements, or the unspotted purity of his life. Had he never written any thing but his Essay on Bailments, he would have left a name unrivalled in the common law, for philosophical accuracy, elegant learning, and finished analysis. Even cold and cautious as is the habit, if not the * The case of Coggs v. Bernard. 2 Ld. Raym. R. 909. เ structure, of a professional mind, it is impossible to suppress enthusiasm, when we contemplate such a man. We recal ourselves to the more immediate topicks on which we have already touched-of the law of bills of exchange and promissory notes, how little can be gleaned from works before the reign of William and Mary? And how many of its most useful principles are younger than the days (as Swift calls her) of the good queen Anne? In the reign of George III. more has been done to give a scientifick cast to these doctrines than in all the preceding ages. And here again we may remark, how much has been gained by the accessions and alluvions of the civil law. It is impossible to read the older decisions without reviving the memory of Marius and Caseregis; or the latter, without perceiving their general coincidence with the summary, but profound treatise of Pothier. If we pass to the other branches of commercial law, we shall find the improvements not less striking nor less important. Molloy and Malynes, feeble and inaccurate as their treatises are now confessed to be, were until comparatively a recent period the principal, though erring guides of the profession, on questions respecting the rights and duties of owners, masters, and mariners, of shippers and freighters, of average, salvage and contribution. In what part of either of these writers, or of any cotemporary or more ancient reporters, shall we find the doctrines relative to the earning and loss of freight and wages, or relative to charter parties, bills of lading, stoppage in transitu and liens, so familiar to the modern merchant and lawyer, traced out with the important practical distinctions belonging to them. What was then despatched in a few pages, would now require a large volume. Much might even at that period have been acquired by a diligent study of the maritime jurists of the continent; but they were either unknown, or with one or two exceptions passed over in silent neglect. The truth is, that maritime law had then but little attracted the attention of the courts of common law; and the only court, in which the subject was much considered, (we mean the admiralty,) laboured under the severe hostility of these courts, and had to maintain an arduous struggle even for existence. Under such circumstances its judgments and opinions carried little weight in Westminster hall; for few were willing to listen to principles which had no authority beyond the narrow walks of Doctors Commons. If we except the aid borrowed from the civilians of the continent, the masterly treatise of Mr. Abbott on the law of shipping is principally founded on the adjudications since the elevation of Lord Mansfield to the bench; and in these adjudications the general consistency with principle is as distinguishable as their practical importance. We have the rather dwelt upon these improvements in maritime law, because they are most obvious to the general observer, and therefore most readily admitted. In the several branches of this law, instead of a few elementary principles and a few decisions turning upon nice distinctions, we have now a regular system, which though not entirely perfect, exhibits such a scientifick arrangement and harmony of principles, that in most of the questions arising in practice, the profession are enabled to relieve themselves from those distressing doubts which never fail to bring discredit upon the law for its supposed uncertainty. But improve. ment has not been confined to commercial law.-A spirit of scientifick research has diffused itself over the other departments of the common law-contested questions are now, and for a long time have been, sifted with the most laborious diligence, and the limits of principles established with a philosophical precision and accuracy, which is rarely observable in the old reports. The doctrines of uses and trusts, of last wills and testaments, of contingent remainders, and executory devices, and of legacies, although resting on ancient and immovable foundations, are reduced to a very high degree of exactness and consistency, and followed out into their regular results with a truly logical conformity to principles, for which we might search in vain in the annals of former times. But, although much has been done in modern times to methodise the common law and give it a systematick character, so that we may not only arrive at its principles by regular analysis, but teach its elements and distinctions by an enlarged synthesis; yet it is not to be imagined that the profession have to encounter less labour, or to exercise less diligence, than formerly, in order to obtain a mastery of the science; or that there is little uncertainty in applying it to the solution of those questions, which perpetually arise in human transactions. To a certain extent law must for ever be subject to uncertainty and doubt, not from the obscurity and fluctuation of decisions, as the vulgar erroneously suppose, but from the endless complexity and variety of human actions. However certain may be the rules of the statute or common law, they must necessarily be general in their language, and incapable of a minute and perfect application to the boundless circumstances of life, which may modify, limit, or effect them. It is impossible to provide by any code, however extensive, for the infinite variety of distinctions as to civil justice, arising from the imperfection of human language and foresight, from the conflict of opposing rights, from the effect of real or apparent hardships, and from those minute equities, which are often found in different scales, adding somewhat to the weight of each, but rarely forming an exact equipoise. Until human actions are capable of being limited on every side to a definite range of circumstances, the fermentations and combinations of which may be perfectly ascertained and enumerated; until there shall be an entire separation of right from wrong in all the business of life and the elements of each shall be immiscible and repulsive; until in short we shall become absolutely pure and perfect in our actions and perfectly conusant of all the operations of the past, the present, and the future, there will remain immeasurable uncertainties in the law, which will call for the exercise of professional talents, and the grave judgments of courts of justice. We must be content, since we cannot hope to realize these utopian dreams of human excellence, to secure the upright and enlightened administration of justice by encouraging learned advocates to fit themselves for eminence at the bar, and by supporting with liberal salaries the dignity, the virtue, and the independence of the bench. We have already intimated an opinion, that the improvements in the various departments of law, have in no degree. lessened the necessity of laborious study to qualify gentlemen for the higher walks of the profession. The changes of two centuries have greatly facilitated the means of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the science; but they have also widened the circle to an almost incalculable extent. Sir Henry Spelman has left us a striking picture of the difficulties and discouragements of the study of his own time. In his preface to his glossary, he says, Emisit me [mater] tamen sub anno altero [1579] Londinum juris nostri capesVol. VI. No. 1. 7 |