"Mr. Shiba: The latest newspapers from Europe contain a statement that your country intends to acquire in the East a port open during all seasons of the year. May I ask you whether there is any truth in that report?

"Mr. Waeber: There is no truth in that. Such statements may perhaps be found in English papers. The English are very cunning. They always say bad things about us in their papers, and thereby inflict no small injury upon Russia. The story that Russia intends to obtain such a port is a canard manufactured by the English. Russia does not pursue an aggressive policy. You know that she had not invaded any country during the past ten years. You may conclude from this that Russia has no ambition either to make any conquest or to obtain a port in these waters."

In the summer of 1895 Russian influence did not count for very much in Korea, but still it was even then at work below the surface. On Inouye's return, Miura succeeded to the post of Japanese Minister, and on October 8, 1895 (five weeks after his arrival), the Korean Queen was murdered. This terrible outrage was a deadly blow to the Japanese power in the Peninsula. Why Miura was so bitterly opposed to the Queen is not precisely known; for rejecting the counsel of Inouye (impressed upon him again and again) to make a friend of the ablest Korean in the Kingdom his reasons must have been very strong. At all events, on the dead body of the Queen a letter to the Court of St. Petersburg was found requesting it not to transfer Mr. Waeber, its representative in Seoul, to another post, as it proposed to do. Then on February 11, 1896, the King and the Crown Prince carried out a project that had been maturing for some time, and took up their quarters in the Russian Legation. Here they remained until February 20, 1897, and during this year, of course, Russian influence in Seoul gathered force apace. The sixty or seventy Japanese advisers previously in the service of the Korean Government either withdrew or were discharged, and all the reforms set on foot in 1895 were practically nullified. Naturally, all this caused uneasiness in Japan, uneasiness all the greater because of the false position she had been placed in by the coup of October 8, 1895. However, what could be done she did, and in June, 1896, the Lobanov-Yamagata Convention, defining the attitude of the two Powers toward Korea, was signed at St. Petersburg. However, the language of this document was somewhat vague; at all events it did not suffice to prevent the Muscovites from sending officers to organize the Korean troops at Seoul, and from a bold attempt to get the management of the Korean finances into their

hands by procuring the appointment of Adviser to the Treasury and of Superintendent of Customs for a Russian official. The document published in the Tokyo journals as a copy of the agreement under which the services of Mr. Alexieff were secured for these positions was in many ways a remarkable one. His services were merely lent to Korea by Russia; the latter paid his normal salary, which Korea supplemented by an honorarium of $1,500 per annum. The period of his engagement was to be unlimited, and, in the event of his withdrawal, no national other than a Korean or a Russian was to be appointed to the office. However, on his arrival in Seoul, M. Alexieff did not find it all smooth sailing. Some time before, Mr. McLeavy Brown, a British subject, had been installed in these very positions, and as Mr. Brown's contract had a good many years to run, he refused to take notice of dismissal from the Korean Government; and, as a matter of fact, he is still in these posts to-day. However, the Russian official did act for some short time in his capacity of Financial Adviser. Meanwhile, Japanese diplomacy had been at work to get the vagueness of the Lobanov-Yamagata Convention rectified, and on April 25, 1898, the Nissi-Rosen Protocol was signed, whose three short articles are worthy of full quotation:

"Art. I. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitively recognize the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and mutually engage to refrain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country.

"Art. II. Desiring to avoid every possible cause of misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage, in case Korea should apply to Japan or to Russia for advice and assistance, not to take any measure in the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, without having previously eome to a mutual agreement on the subject.

"Art. III. In view of the large development of Japanese commercial and industrial enterprise in Korea, as well as the considerable number of Japanese subjects resident in that country, the Imperial Russian Government will not impede the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

"Done at Tokyo, in duplicate, this 25th day of April, 1898."

Meanwhile, there had been happenings which at their occurrence greatly puzzled the journalists of the Far East, but which subsequent developments readily accounted for. Toward the end of 1897, Russia had asked for the exclusive concession of some land on Deer Island, which had been previously staked off as a site for a foreign settlement, and the request had been met by

shuffling and evasion. About the same time, the Korean interpreter to the Russian Legation had been set upon and nearly done to death by some of his own countrymen. Besides, there were other indications that the Koreans were becoming very restive under Muscovite domination. But all this did not prepare observers to expect what seemed to be M. de Speyer's extraordinary action in sending his famous despatch of March 7, 1898, to the Korean Foreign Office. The following translation of that document is from the Seoul Independent:

"Recently I have been informed that there exists a deplorable condition of affairs in Seoul; many idlers among your people, claiming to be gifted politicians, create disturbance by opposing Russian interests. This state of affairs naturally causes great surprise to my Imperial Sovereign, the Emperor of Russia. At the request of your Imperial Sovereign and your Government, the Russian Government had sent military instructors to drill the soldiers and to guard the palace, and an Adviser for your Finance Department. This action on the part of my Government plainly indicates Russia's intention of helping your country as a neighbor and her desire to strengthen your independence. But your Government did not seem to appreciate the importance of Russia's action at the time, and now your Government freely prevents Russia from accomplishing the advantages and beneficial results for your country which she intended. The present attitude of your Government is so plain that Russia cannot endure this condition much longer. Therefore my Emperor has graciously ordered me to report fully to your Emperor and inquire of your Government definitely whether Korea still desires to be benefited by Russia's help or not, and if the military instructors and Finance Adviser are not considered necessary by your Emperor and your Government, my Government will make some other necessary arrangements according to the circumstances, but your Government must maintain your independence in the future according to its ability. I am awaiting your reply and hope it will be received within twenty-four hours, and I further request Your Excellency to report to your Emperor that I desire to obtain an audience with him for the purpose of informing him of the instructions I have received from my Imperial Sovereign concerning this matter."

Five days later, M. de Speyer received a reply, and from it, to the amazement of everybody, invertebrate Korea appeared to have taken up a strong attitude. The despatch in question was long and rambling, but the pith of it is contained in the two following paragraphs:

"Through your Sovereign's kind motives and your Government's friendly disposition, our military and financial affairs have made much progress. Both the Adviser and instructors diligently and conscientiously discharged their duties, so that the Imperial Guard has been trained satisfactorily and the financial condition of the country placed on a systematic basis. These are all due to the unceasing efforts of your Government and we will never forget your magnanimous spirit.

"Our Government has decided that we will continue to manage our affairs according to the methods which your officials have so kindly introduced, though we must place the controlling power of these departments in the hands of our own countrymen. We will not employ any foreign military instructors or advisers. This decision was arrived at by the unanimous wishes of the old statesmen, the present Government and the people at large; also through the enlightenment and independent spirit which your Government has so diligently inculcated among us. I am sure that your Imperial Sovereign and your Government will be glad to know that our people have become so progressive and enlightened as to desire to maintain their own sovereignty."

The reply of M. de Speyer to this was delightfully sarcastic toward the close. (To understand the opening sentences of his despatch, it must be premised that the Korean Foreign Minister had stated that the Emperor of Korea proposed to "send an envoy to your capital who will carry the personal messages of gratitude from our Emperor to your Sovereign.") The following is the Russian Minister's communication:

"Sir: I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 12th inst., in which communication you have intimated to me that your Government intends to send an ambassador to St. Petersburg. I have just been instructed by my Imperial Sovereign to inform you that the sending of the envoy is not at all necessary, and the Russian Government does not care to receive any message of thanks. Russia only desires to extend her friendliness; but she never cares to force it upon any one. Your Government asked us to send military instructors and a finance adviser and we complied. But now your Government considers that Russian officials are no longer needed, and you state that Korea can manage her own affairs without aid from Russia. Russia only congratulates Korea upon having made such progress in so short a time that she is able to maintain her independence unassisted by foreign instructors and advisers.

"I have already instructed our military officers and Finance Adviser to discontinue their duties in the Korean service. March 17th, 1898.

"A. DE SPEYER."

Doubtless, Japan's attitude toward the Russian interpretation of the Lobanov-Yamagata Convention, and the approaching agreement on the matter of the Nissi-Rosen Protocol, went a long way to account for this, at first, seemingly inexplicable development in Seoul. But other events of even more startling import were in progress elsewhere, and in all likelihood they had not a little to do with Russia's withdrawal from all open interference with Korean politics for the time being.

On October 18, 1897, it was telegraphed that the Russian fleet had entered Port Arthur with the intention of wintering there. And then, just about the date of signing of the Nissi-Rosen Con

vention (April 24, 1898), it became known in Japan that the rumors of a convention between Russia and China, in terms of which Port Arthur, Talien-wan and adjacent territory were to be "leased" to the former, were only too well founded, such a convention having been actually signed at Pekin on the preceding 27th of March-ten days after the withdrawal of the Russian officers and Financial Adviser from the service of Korea.

Of course, in Japan the ferment caused by this intelligence was intense. The capture of Port Arthur by Japanese troops in 1894 had amazed the world, and the Japanese looked upon that fortress as one of the proudest trophies of the war. At the peace negotiations their minds were resolutely bent upon retaining it. So, when Russia and her allies requested them to retrocede it with the whole Liautung Peninsula to China, the three Powers were asking of Japan a very great deal indeed. However, as the request preferred or the advice proffered (with a backing of forty-seven war vessels) was in the interests of the Peace of the Far East, Japan complied with it as gracefully as she could, and returned to her vanquished enemy the strongest fortress and the best dock-yard in the Far East. This was in April, 1895, and in 1898, within three years from that date, the legitimate booty won for Japan by the prowess of her soldiers had been appropriated by Russia, through the tortuous devices of her diplomats, and the phrase, the "Peace of the Far East," had proved to be nothing but a more extended and expansive fashion of spelling the name of the Muscovite! Naturally enough, there was a violent explosion of popular feeling in Japan. By the masses an immediate war with Russia would have been welcomed, while even some of the less cautious and far-seeing of her statesmen were in no mood to pause to count the ultimate cost of such a struggle. But in the midst of the ferment the ministers in power never for a moment lost their coolness and calmness. Japanese troops still held Wei-hai-wei, and, in terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty, were to hold it until the whole of the indemnity was paid. China had signified her intention of liquidating the whole of that in May. Many publicists and some of her statesmen argued that the Russion occupation of Port Arthur fully justified Japan in keeping her garrison in Wei-hai-wei, even after every cent of the indemnity had been received. But the Tokyo Cabinet did not take that view. Negotiations between Great Britain, China and Japan were set