tance, or at least distrust among themselves, is not one of the worst remedies. For it is a desperate case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the state be full of discord and faction, and those that are against it be entire and united.

We will give nearly the whole of the Sixteenth Essay, entitled Of Atheism,' which is in the collection of 1612.

I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind. And therefore God never wrought miracle to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it. It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and 'Deity. Nay, even that school which is most accused of atheism, doth most demonstrate religion—that is the school of Leucipus, and Democritus, and Epicurus. For it is a thousand times more credible that four mutable elements and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions or seeds, unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without a Divine Marshal. The Scripture saith, The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God," It is not said, "The fool hath thought in his heart; so as he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it; for none deny there is a God but those for whom it maketh that there were no God. It appeareth in nothing more that atheism is rather in the lip than in the heart of man than by this, that atheists will ever be talking of that their opinion, as if they fainted in it within themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened by the consent of others; nay more, you shall have atheists strive to get disciples, as it fareth with other sects; and, which is most of all, you shall have of them that will suffer for atheism, and not recant: whereas if they did truly think that there were no such thing as God, why should they trouble themselves? Epicurus is charged that he did but dissemble for his credit's sake, when he affirmed there were blessed natures, but such as enjoyed themselves without having respect to the government of the world, wherein, they

more.

say, he did temporize, though in secret he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced, for his words are noble and divine-Non Deos vulgi negare profanum, sed vulgi opiniones Diis applicare profanum.'* Plato could have said no They that deny a God destroy man's nobility; for certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body; and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. It destroys likewise magnanimity and the raising of human nature. For take an example of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man who, to him, is instead of a God, or melior natura; which courage is manifestly such as that creature, without that confidence of a better nature than his own, could never attain. So man, when he resteth and assureth himself upon Divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain. Therefore as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself above human frailty.

The Seventeenth Essay, also in the collection of 1612, is entitled 'Of Superstition.' Its leading idea is stated in the commencement :—

It were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of him; for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely; and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose: Surely,' saith he, 'I had rather a great deal men should say there was no such man at all as Plutarch, than that they should say that there was one Plutarch that would eat his children as soon as they were born;' as the poets speak of Saturn. And as the contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men. Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation; all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men.

Of the Eighteenth, entitled 'Of Travel,' first published in 1625, it may be enough to give the concluding

sentences:

*It is not profane to deny the deities of the vulgar, but it is profane to apply the opinions of the vulgar to the divinities.

When a traveller returneth home, let him not leave the countries where he hath travelled altogether behind him, but maintain a correspondence by letters with those of his acquaintance which are of most worth. And let his travel appear rather in his discourse than in his apparel or gesture; and in his discourse let him be rather advised in his answers than forward to tell stories. And let it appear that he doth not change his country manners for those of foreign parts, but only prick in some flowers of that he hath learned abroad into the customs of his own country.

The Nineteenth 'Of Empire,' which is in the collection of 1612, sets out thus:

It is a miserable state of mind to have few things to desire and many things to fear, and yet that commonly is the case of kings, who, being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing and have many representations of perils and shadows, which make their minds the less clear. And this is one reason also of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of-That the king's heart is inscrutable;' for multiude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man's heart hard to find or sound. Hence it comes likewise that princes many times make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys-sometimes upon a building, sometimes upon erecting of an order, sometimes upon the advancing of a person, sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art or feat of the hand-as Nero for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for playing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible unto those that know not the principleThat the mind of man is more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small things than by standing at a stay in great.' see also that kings that have been fortunate conquerors in their first years (it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes) turn in their latter years to be superstitious and melancholy-as did Alexauder the Great, Dioclesian, and, in our memory, Charles the Fifth, and others; for he that is used to go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favour, and is not the thing he was.

We

From the Twentieth Essay, Of Counsel,' also published in 1612, we extract a small portion at the close:

It is in vain for princes to take counsel concerning matters, if they take no counsel likewise concerning persons; for all matters are as dead images, and the life of the execution of affairs resteth in the good choice of persons.

In choice

of committees for ripening business for the council, it is better to choose indifferent persons than to make an indifferency by putting in those that are strong on both sides. I commend, also, standing commissions-as for trade, for treasure, for war, for suits, for some provinces; for where there be divers particular councils, and but one council of estate (as it is in Spain), they are in effect no more than standing commissions, save that they have greater authority. Let such as are to inform councils out of their particular professions (as lawyers, seamen, mintmen, and the like), be first heard before committees, and then, as occasion serves, before the council. And let them not come in multitudes or in a tribunitious manner, for that is to clamour councils, not to inform them. A long table, and a square table, or seats about the walls, seem things of form, but are things of substance; for at a long table, a few at the upper end in effect sway all the business, but in the other form there is more use of the counsellors' opinions that sit lower. A king, when he presides in council, let him beware how he opens his own inclination too much in that which he propoundeth, for else counsellors will but take the wind of him, and, instead of giving free counsel, will sing him a song of 'Placebo.'*

The Twenty-first, entitled 'Of Delays,' first published in 1625, is very short: it concludes thus :—.

Generally it is good to commit the beginnings of all great actions to Argus with his hundred eyes, and the ends to Briareus with his hundred hands-first to watch and then to speed. For the helmet of Pluto, which maketh the politic man go invisible, is secrecy in the council, and celerity in the execution; for when things are once come to the execution, there is no secrecy comparable to celerity-like the motion of a bullet in the air, which flieth so swift as it outruns the eye.

The Twenty-second,Of Cunning,' published in 1612, begins as follows:

We take cunning for a sinister or crooked wisdom. And

I will make myself agreeable.

certainly there is great difference between a cunning man and a wise man, not only in point of honesty but in point of ability. There be that can pack the cards, and yet cannot play well; so there are some that are good in canvasses and factions that are otherwise weak men. Again, it is one thing to understand persons, and another thing to understand matters; for many are perfect in men's humours that are not greatly capable of the real part of business, which is the constitution of one that hath studied men more than books. Such men are fitter for practice than for counsel, and they are good but in their own alley; turn them to new men and they have lost their aim.

The Twenty-third, also published in 1612, is entitled 'Of Wisdom for a Man's Self,' and is thus wound up :

Wisdom for a man's self is, in many branches thereof, a depraved thing: it is the wisdom of rats, that will be sure to leave a house somewhat before it fall; it is the wisdom of the fox, that thrusts out the badger who digged and made room for him; it is the wisdom of crocodiles, that shed tears when they would devour. But that which is specially to be noticed, is, that those which (as Cicero says of Pompey) are 'Sui amantes sine rivali,** are many times unfortunate; and whereas they have all their time sacrificed to themselves, they become in the end themselves sacrifices to the inconstancy of fortune, whose wings they thought by their self-wisdom to have pinioned.

The Twenty-fourth Essay, entitled 'Of Innovations,' and first published in 1625, we give entire :

As the births of living creatures at first are ill shapen, so are all innovations, which are the births of time. Yet notwithstanding, as those that first bring honour into their family are commonly more worthy than most that succeed, so the first precedent (if it be good) is seldom attained by imitation. For ill to man's nature, as it stands perverted, hath a natural motion, strongest in continuance; but good, as a forced motion, strongest at first. Surely every medicine is an innovation, and he that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils, for time is the greatest innovator. And if time, of course, alter things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter

*Lovers of themselves without a rival.