To End a WarRandom House, 1998 - 408 pages When President Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to Bosnia as America's chief negotiator in late 1995, he took a gamble that would eventually redefine his presidency. But there was no saying then, at the height of the war, that Holbrooke's mission would succeed. The odds were strongly against it. ;;;;;;;; As passionate as he was controversial, Holbrooke believed that the only way to bring peace to the Balkans was through a complex blend of American leadership, aggressive and creative diplomacy, and a willingness to use force, if necessary, in the cause for peace. This was not a universally popular view. Resistance was fierce within the United Nations and the chronically divided Contact Group, and in Washington, where many argued that the United States should not get more deeply involved. This book is Holbrooke's gripping inside account of his mission, of the decisive months when, belatedly and reluctantly but ultimately decisively, the United States reasserted its moral authority and leadership and ended Europe's worst war in over half a century. To End a War reveals many important new details of how America made this historic decision. ;;;;;;;; What George F. Kennan has called Holbrooke's "heroic efforts" were shaped by the enormous tragedy with which the mission began, when three of his four team members were killed during their first attempt to reach Sarajevo. In Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Paris, Athens, and Ankara, and throughout the dramatic roller-coaster ride at Dayton, he tirelessly imposed, cajoled, and threatened in the quest to stop the killing and forge a peace agreement. Holbrooke's portraits of the key actors, from officials in the White House and thelysé e Palace to the leaders in the Balkans, are sharp and unforgiving. His explanation of how the United States was finally forced to intervene breaks important new ground, as does his discussion of the near disaster in the early period of the implementation of the Dayton agreement. ;;;;;;;; To End a War is a brilliant portrayal of high-wire, high-stakes diplomacy in one of the toughest negotiations of modern times. A classic account of the uses and misuses of American power, its lessons go far beyond the boundaries of the Balkans and provide a powerful argument for continued American leadership in the modern world. |
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Page 14
... effort will continue and that you will lead it . And see Izetbegovic before you leave . " Knowing we were fo- cused on our loss , the President was thinking ahead for us . He wanted to show publicly that the tragedy would not stop the ...
... effort will continue and that you will lead it . And see Izetbegovic before you leave . " Knowing we were fo- cused on our loss , the President was thinking ahead for us . He wanted to show publicly that the tragedy would not stop the ...
Page 174
... effort on the Hill would be necessary . Just before our team returned from the region , Kornblum had invited French and Russian officials separately to Washington to discuss a postsettlement military and civilian structure . The British ...
... effort on the Hill would be necessary . Just before our team returned from the region , Kornblum had invited French and Russian officials separately to Washington to discuss a postsettlement military and civilian structure . The British ...
Page 353
... efforts [ were ] seen as part of the campaign to end a sense of drift that had settled over the Bosnia peacemaking effort . " Our trip helped revive the implementation process , and set the stage for further progress . Bob Gelbard would ...
... efforts [ were ] seen as part of the campaign to end a sense of drift that had settled over the Bosnia peacemaking effort . " Our trip helped revive the implementation process , and set the stage for further progress . Bob Gelbard would ...
Contents
The Most Dangerous Road in Europe August 1521 1995 | 3 |
BOSNIA AT | 19 |
A Personal Prelude 1992 | 34 |
Copyright | |
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Administration agreed agreement Albright Ambassador American annex asked Balkan Banja Luka began Belgrade bombing Bosnia Bosnian Serbs called Carl Bildt cease-fire Chirac Chris Hill civilian Clark colleagues commander conference Contact Group Croatian Croats Dayton Dayton agreement delegation Deputy diplomatic discussion Donilon eastern Slavonia effort elections ethnic Europe European Federation final Foreign Minister Frasure French Geneva Gorazde Haris Haris Silajdzic IFOR Igman issue Izetbegovic Joulwan journalists Karadzic Kerrick Kornblum Krajina Krajisnik later leaders meeting military Milosevic Milosevic's Mladic Muslims NATO negotiating team Owen Pale Pardew Pauline Neville-Jones peace Pentagon Perry political President Clinton Prime Minister problem refugees Republika Srpska role Russian Sacirbey Sandy Berger Sarajevo Secretary senior Serbia Shalikashvili Silajdzic Smith Srebrenica Strobe Talbott talks tion told Tony Lake trip troops Tudjman United Nations wanted Warren Christopher Washington White House York Yugoslav Yugoslavia Zagreb