fiat: Subj. because the relative clause is subordinate to ut peccetur, cf. I 96 ut immortalitate vincamur, sic animi praestantia vinci; below § 92 ut membra moveantur, and Roby § 1778. ut satius fuerit: see n. on 1 69, and cf. just below haud scio an melius fuerit perhaps it would have been better'. cum pernicie: cf. 11 8 cum magno vulnere and Index. vinum aegrotis: on the use of wine for the sick, see Plato Rep. III 405 foll., Theophrast. Char. 13, and below § 78. spe dubiae salutis: 'from the hope of a possible cure'. Allen cites dubiae dum vota salutis conciperent Lucan 1 506. motum celerem cogitationis: cf. Plato Leg. x 896 'it is soul which moves the universe ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσεσι, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν, ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν Avtovμévŋv k.t.d., below § 71 sine animi motu, Off. 1 132 motus animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitationis, alteri appetitus. pestifera est: so edd. after Sch. for p. sint of MSS. The Ind. is required, as giving the view of the speaker, like quia prodest before. § 70. idcirco consuluit: 'abbreviated for idcirco consuluisse dicitur a vobis' Sch. Cf. below non idcirco uterentur, and § 79 cur negligant. bona ratione donavit: a little below it is asserted that man receives bare ratio from God, and achieves bona ratio by his own effort. si modo ulli sunt: so in § 71 si modo habemus, see Draeg. § 555, Mayor on Plin. Ep. III 15 § 3, and Index. non placet paucis—consultum sit: cf. 1 23, a similar argument was used by the English deists to disprove a divine revelation, see Butler's Analogy Pt. II ch. 6. Da (3). It cannot be alleged that reason is in itself good, and that any evil which may arise from it is owing to man's abuse of it. As a fact it is of neutral quality, and is made good or bad by man. S$ 70, 71. There are several difficulties in the sections which follow. If we take a general view of the whole passage from § 65 to § 78, we find (1) the evil effects of reason shown by examples from tragedy (§§ 65-68), from comedy (§§ 72, 73), from the law-courts (§§ 74, 75); and (2) the rejoinder to the Stoic objection that these are owing not to reason in itself, but to man's abuse of reason (§§ 70, 71 and §§ 76-78). It is difficult to explain this breaking up of the subject; and closer inspection shows repetition in § 69 as compared with § 74 (the transition from the stage to the forum), and again in § 69 as compared with § 78 (the danger arising from the use of medicinal remedies). Turning more particularly to §§ 70 and 71, we find still greater difficulties. The sentence nec enim Herculi-potuerant comes in very abruptly, and in fact is scarcely intelligible, as it stands in the MSS. It is only by a comparison with the parallel passage in § 76 that we learn patrimonia spe bene tradendi relinquimus, qua possumus falli; deus falli qui potest? This of course explains why there can be no comparison between the divine gift and the human legacy, but the essential point, that God cannot err, is not mentioned in the earlier passage. If we transfer the sentences non enim ut patrimonium—voluissent from § 71 and place them after similitudo, we remove them from a context in which they are unmeaning, and we get a natural explanation for the question quae est in collatione ista similitudo. Again the sentences beginning quae enim libido, and injustitiae autem seem to me to have no connexion with those which precede them according to the мs order; but, if we put injustitiae-subesset after amice dedit, and then go on with quae enim libido—a nobis, everything falls into its proper place. Lastly it seems to me far more natural that the general statement multi enim— obfuerunt should precede the particular examples nec enim Herculi— potuerunt, than the reverse. The only difficulty which will then remain is the omission of the statement contained in § 76 that ‘God cannot make mistakes as men do', which ought to have followed nocere voluissent; but this omission is easily explicable, if I am right in my general view of the dislocation which the passage has undergone. It remains to account for the repetitions above noticed in the general argument; and this seems to me most easily done, if we suppose Cicero to have written, first of all, the shorter summary contained in §§ 69–71, and then to have expanded it in chapters XXIX to XXXII Medea modo-nemo esse possit (§§ 71–79); and that both were inserted in the text by the mistake of the original editor. Or is it possible that Carneades met the Stoic proof of Divine benevolence shown in the gift of reason, by a twofold argument, one that which Cicero gives fully in the 2nd passage and briefly and confusedly in the 1st, viz. our experience of the mischief arising from the use of reason, which an infinitely wise Being must have foreseen; and the other, that we cannot judge of the intention of an agent from the result of his action, because experience shows that well-intended actions are often harmful and illintended beneficial? If we are to take this view, Cicero has entirely failed to distinguish between the two arguments, and has also destroyed the force of the latter by introducing his quae est similitudo, our human experience being the only ground on which such an argument could be based. 'you are accustomed Locus is not merely There is no Ch. XXVIII. huic loco sic soletis occurrere: to meet (àñavтâv) this line of argument as follows'. 'topic', but an argument capable of general application. reference here to anything in the speech of Balbus. For the subject matter see below § 76. non idcirco uterentur: 'man's abuse of the Divine favour is no proof that heaven has not made the best provision for us'. The verb is attracted to the tense of the Infinitive; see 1 8 n. on profecisse. quisquam istuc negat: as I have explained in the Introduction on Mss, I think the archetype must have had quisquam stuc, which seems to me to differ from quisquamne istuc as being less ceremonious and more contemptuous and therefore better suited to the passage. Lachmann on Lucr. p. 197 gives examples of the shortened form of iste in Cicero, and we may probably add naturae sta in § 27, where A gives ste, cf. Ac. II 109 with Reid's n. For the interrogative use of quisquam cf. Div. Caec. 20 in ejus modi re quisquam tam impudens reperietur? Acad. II 89 quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is putabat quae videbantur? Verr. 1 142 quid enim? quisquam ad meam pecuniam me invito aspirat, quisquam accedit? Verr. 11 137 hoc cum tute fateare, quisquam dubitabit quin..., also Piso 26, 30, Sulla 45, Phil. x 14. quae est in collatione ista similitudo: cf. above § 9 quam simile istud sit tu videris, and below § 90. nec enim Herculi: as pointed out above, this is an answer to the general argument from effect to cause, but has no reference to the particular illustration employed, the evil effects of a legacy misused, nor to the special point urged by the Stoics, viz. man's power to counteract the benevolent design of the Deity. vomica: 'a tumour', lit. 'something which discharges'. Pliny uses it of quicksilver inside the matrix (N. H. xxxIII 32). Jason of Pherae, who at one time threatened to give to Thessaly the preponderance which Macedon obtained under Philip, was assassinated B.C. 370. For the story here told cf. Plin. N. H. vII 51 Pheraeus Jason deploratus a medicis vomicae morbo, cum mortem in acie quaereret, vulnerato pectore medicinam invenit ex hoste. From this it would seem that it was a wound inflicted by an enemy in battle; but Seneca Benef. II 18. § 8 rather implies that it was the attempt of an assassin : venenum aliquando pro remedio fuit, non ideo numeratur inter salubria. Quaedam prosunt nec obligant: tuber quidam tyranni gladio divisit, qui ad occidendum eum venerat: non ideo ille tyrannus gratias egit, quod rem, quam medicorum manus reformidaverant, nocendo sanavit; also Plut. Mor. p. 89 (where it is said to have happened, not to Jason, but to ròv éσσadov Пpoμŋéa), Val. Max. 1 8 extr. 6. qui dederit: 'the man that gave'. Qui with a general or indefinite force, when it is subordinate to a Subj., is usually itself followed by a Subj. The qui dedit below suggests a definite instance, 'the giver' or 'the man who gave'. § 71. suscipitur...perficitur: rightly joined with facinus, but only by zeugma with avaritia. sine animi motu: cf. above § 69 motum istum celerem cogitationis. omnis opinio ratio est: 'every belief is of the nature of thought'. Plato and Aristotle draw a broad distinction between dóέa and vous or Móyos, but the Academics treated it as a mere verbal difference; the same kind of mental assent was knowledge in the wise and opinion in the foolish (Sext. vII 153). The Stoics even went so far as to say that every feeling was a judgment and involved a rational element, cf. Plut. Mor. p. 441 rò πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης κρίσεως ῥώμην προσλαBóvra, so Galen (Hipp. Plat. p. 476) Chrysippus identifies the rational and the emotional faculties'. See below. bonam rationem-a nobis: see below on § 86 virtutem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit. timiditatis semina: compare the definition metus est opinio impendentis mali Tusc. Iv 15. The exact reverse of the statement in the text would be nearer the truth. The seed of every virtue or vice is the natural impulse, which is elevated into a virtue by the process of rationalization: to paraphrase the words of Aristotle, 'moral virtue is a particular state of the irrational part of the soul, under the limitations of right reason'. Timidity is a quality common to man with the irrational animals; his superior intelligence gives it a wider scope, but is in no wise the cause of it. Ch. XXIX. inita subductaque ratione-meditantes: 'planning their atrocious crimes with a cool calculation of the profits'. Literally inire rationem is 'to go into a calculation', as in Cato R. R. 2 rationem inire oportet operarum, dierum; subd. rat. is 'to balance accounts', i.e. to subtract one side from the other, cf. Hortens. fr. 89 Orelli (Non. p. 399) non et sine ea cogitatione ineundis subducendisque rationibus; Fin. II 60 quid? fortes viri voluptatumne calculis subductis praelium ineunt? ib. § 78, Plaut. Capt. 1 2 89 subducam rationem quantillum argentum mi siet; Curcul. III 1. 1 subduxi ratiunculam quantum aeris mihi sit, quantumque alieni siet. Da (4). The mischievous effects of reason shown by examples from Comedy. $$ 72, 73. § 72. levitates comicae: 'the trifles of comedy', cf. Fin. 1 62 amatoriis levitatibus dediti. These are properly included in scaena above § 69; the adjoining words sentit forum are also repeated below § 79 in the form veniamus in forum. parumne semper: 'do they not show abundance of reasoning on all occasions?' cf. above § 66 parumne ratiocinari. Sch. in his appendix points out that parum is to be taken with in ratione versantur, not with semper, so that there is no reason for changing semper to saepe (as Madv.). Eunucho: the lines are taken from the 1st scene of Terence's play. They are quoted also by Horace (Sat. II 3. 262 foll.) and Persius (Sat. v 161). Synephebis cf. above 1 13. Academicorum more: cf. 1 11 quibus propositum est contra omnes dicere, and I 13 procax Academia. in amore: Ribbeck restores the metre as follows, in amore suave est summo summaque inopia. studeat tui: the object exciting emotion is found in the Gen., not only with Impersonals, such as poenitet pudet, but also with Personal verbs in the older writers, e.g. Plaut. Mil. Gl. 794 ille ejus domi cupiet, ib. 956 quae cupiunt tui, where Lorenz cites Aul. 243 fastidit mei, Stich. 334, Ter. Phorm. 971 vereri feminae; so revereor in Varro ap. Non. 497, and cupiens ordinarily, see Roby § 1328. § 73. suggerit: 'subjoins', cf. Liv. II 8 Bruto statim Lucretium suggerunt. fructu fallas-nomen: ['one may cheat him of the profits or pocket a debt by a (stolen or forged) letter'. Plaut. Curcul. 360-460 and Molière's Les fourberies de Scapin would illustrate this. R.]. Averto is strictly to turn aside from its proper end to one's own use, cf. Verr. III 170 ut praetor ...pecunias, quas civitatibus distribuere debeat, eas omnes avertat atque auferat; Philipp. v 11 sestertium septiens millies falsis perscriptionibus avertit (by means of false pay warrants'). Nomen is properly the debtor's name in the ledger, hence a debt; cf. Verr. v 17 pecuniam sibi esse in nominibus, numeratam in praesenti non habere, see Holden on Off. III 59. percutias pavidum: 'frighten him out of his wits by a piece of bad news'. neque ut: I prefer this reading to the nec quid of Ribbeck and Mu. It is not the 'what', but the how, which puzzles the son, 'how can I rob one who treats me so liberally?' inde ab eo, so hinc (Ter. Ad. III 3. 7 Syrum video, hinc scibo); unde (Orat. 1 67 ille ipse unde cognovit), and frequently, see Roby § 1263, Reid on Cato 12, Dietsch on Sall. Cat. 1 3. praestrigias praestrinxit: 'my father's generosity has trumped all my tricks', 'defeated my stratagems', lit. 'taken the edge off (i.e. 'spoilt') my juggling'. As to the spelling, the oldest codex preserves the r just below, and this is the form in the best Mss of Plautus, see Georges s. v. The later form praestigiae is due to that tendency to lighten the pronunciation of compounds, which shows itself also in such changes as that of a into i; for other exx. of the omission of r see Roby § 185. 2. The word is often used metaphorically as in Acad. II 45 (there is need of attention) ne ab iis, quae clara sunt ipsa per sese, quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur; Fin. Iv 74 ex isdem verborum praestigiis (the Stoic paradoxes have arisen). Phormio: Act II Sc. 2 of Terence's play. Da (5). The mischievous effects of reason shown by examples from the law-courts. SS 74, 75. Ch. xxx § 74. in forum: see above § 69. [sessum it: sedere, like κañola, of the judge on the bench. For the phrase cf. Sen. Contr. 180 § 9 jussit ire sessum in equestria. J. E. B. M.], also Cic. Fam. x 32 § 2 Herennium in XIIII sessum deduxit. quid ut judicetur: on the position of ut Sch. refers to Madv. Fin. |