The Human Intellect: with an Introduction Upon Psychology and the Soul
C. Scribner, 1873 - 673 pages
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acquired act of knowledge action activity agent animal applied apprehended Aristotle assert associational psychology attention attributes bodily body called capacity chemical color common concept connected consciousness definite Descartes developed discerned distinct distinguished doctrine Dugald Stewart effect elements energy excited existence experience explained extended external fact faculty feeling force functions furnished Herbart Herbert Spencer higher human ideas imagination individual intel intellect involve IOLANTHE J. S. Mill judgment known language Leibnitz logical Malebranche material objects matter memory mental metaphysical mind mind's nature nerves nominalist notion observed organs original peculiar perceived perception phenomena philosophical physiology Plato present principle processes psychical psychology question reason recall redintegration relations representation representative respect result retina rience sciousness sense sense-perception sensorium separate single somnambulism soul soul's space species spirit substance suggest taste theory things thought tion touch truth vital whole words
Page 276 - Besides this, there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom : ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them ; they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, show themselves together.
Page 417 - Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man.
Page 458 - Euclid's, and show by construction that its truth was known to us ; to demonstrate, for example, that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal...
Page 417 - For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract comprehensive and difficult) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once.
Page 309 - But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory, signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.
Page 417 - Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
Page 117 - The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself: And it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object.
Page 318 - Thou didst swear to me upon a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, upon Wednesday in Wheeson week, when the Prince broke thy head for liking his father to a singing-man of Windsor— thou didst swear to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to marry me and make me my lady thy wife.
Page 87 - This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself : and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense.
Page 367 - Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical. Because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence.