and to inflame. And let no prince measure the danger of them by this, whether they be just or unjust; for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable, who do often spurn at their own good; nor yet by this, whether the griefs wherepon they rise be in fact great or small, for they are the most dangerous discontentments where the fear is greater than the feeling. Dolendi modus, timendi non item.** Besides, in great oppressions the same things that provoke the patience do withal mate the courage, but in fears it is not so. Neither let any prince or state be secure concerning dicontentments because they have been often or have been long, and yet no peril hath ensued; for as it is true that every vapour or fume doth not turn into a storm, so it is neverthelss true, that storms, though they blow over divers times, yet may fall at last; and as the Spanish proverb noteth well, 'The cord breaketh at the last by the weakest pull.'

The part of Epimetheus might well become Prometheus in the case of discontentments, for there is not a better provision against them. Epimetheus, when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the lid and kept Hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly the politic and artificial nourishing and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men from hopes to hopes, is one of the best antidotes against the poison of discontentments. And it is a certain sign of a wise government and proceeding when it can hold men's hearts by hopes, when it cannot by satisfaction; and when it can handle things in such manner as no evil shall appear so peremptory, but that it hath some outlet of hope; which is the less hard to do, because both particular persons and factions are apt enough to flatter themselves, or at least to brave that they believe not.

Also the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head whereunto discontented persons may resort, and under whom they may join, is a known but an excellent point of caution. I understand a fit head to be one that hath greatness and reputation, that hath confidence with the discontented party, and upon whom they turn their eyes, and that is thought discontented in his own particular; which kind of persons are either to be won and reconciled to the state, and that in a fast and true manner, or to be fronted with some other of the same. party that may oppose them, and so divide the reputation. Generally the dividing and breaking of all factions and combinations that are adverse to the state, and setting them at dis

*There are bounds to grief, but not to fear.

tance, or at least distrust among themselves, is not one of the worst remedies. For it is a desperate case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the state be full of discord and faction, and those that are against it be entire and united.

We will give nearly the whole of the Sixteenth Essay, entitled Of Atheism,' which is in the collection of 1612.

I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind. And therefore God never wrought miracle to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it. It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no further; but when beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and 'Deity. Nay, even that school which is most accused of atheism, doth most demonstrate religion-that is the school of Leucipus, and Democritus, and Epicurus. For it is a thousand times more credible that four mutable elements and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions or seeds, unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without a Divine Marshal. The Scripture saith, 'The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. It is not said, "The fool hath thought in his heart; so as he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it; for none deny there is a God but those for whom it maketh that there were no God. It appeareth in nothing more that atheism is rather in the lip than in the heart of man than by this, that atheists will ever be talking of that their opinion, as if they fainted in it within themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened by the consent of others; nay more, you shall have atheists strive to get disciples, as it fareth with other sects; and, which is most of all, you shall have of them that will suffer for atheism, and not recant: whereas if they did truly think that there were no such thing as God, why should they trouble themselves? Epicurus is charged that he did but dissemble for his credit's sake, when he affirmed there were blessed natures, but such as enjoyed themselves without having respect to the government of the world, wherein, they

more.

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say, he did temporize, though in secret he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced, for his words are noble and divine-Non Deos vulgi negare profanum, sed vulgi opiniones Diis applicare profanum.'* Plato could have said no They that deny a God destroy man's nobility; for certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body; and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. It destroys likewise magnanimity and the raising of human nature. For take an example of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man who, to him, is instead of a God, or melior natura; which courage is manifestly such as that creature, without that confidence of a better nature than his own, could never attain. So man, when he resteth and assureth himself upon Divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain. Therefore as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself above human frailty.

The Seventeenth Essay, also in the collection of 1612, is entitled 'Of Superstition.' Its leading idea is stated in the commencement :

It were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of him; for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely; and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose: Surely,' saith he, I had rather a great deal men should say there was no such man at all as Plutarch, than that they should say that there was one Plutarch that would eat his children as soon as they were born;' as the poets speak of Saturn. And as the contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men. Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation; all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men.

Of the Eighteenth, entitled 'Of Travel,' first published in 1625, it may be enough to give the concluding

sentences:

It is not profane to deny the deities of the vulgar, but it is profane to apply the opinions of the vulgar to the divinities.

When a traveller returneth home, let him not leave the countries where he hath travelled altogether behind him, but maintain a correspondence by letters with those of his acquaintance which are of most worth. And let his travel appear rather in his discourse than in his apparel or gesture; and in his discourse let him be rather advised in his answers than forward to tell stories. And let it appear that he doth not change his country manners for those of foreign parts, but only prick in some flowers of that he hath learned abroad into the customs of his own country.

The Nineteenth Of Empire,' which is in the collection of 1612, sets out thus:

It is a miserable state of mind to have few things to desire and many things to fear, and yet that commonly is the case of kings, who, being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing and have many representations of perils and shadows, which make their minds the less clear. And this is one reason also of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of 'That the king's heart is inscrutable;' for multiude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man's heart hard to find or sound. Hence it comes likewise that princes many times make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys-sometimes upon a building, sometimes upon erecting of an order, sometimes upon the advancing of a person, sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art or feat of the hand-as Nero for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for playing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible unto those that know not the principleThat the mind of man is more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small things than by standing at a stay in great.' We see also that kings that have been fortunate conquerors in their first years (it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes) turn in their latter years to be superstitious and melancholy-as did Alexander the Great, Dioclesian, and, in our memory, Charles the Fifth, and others; for he that is used to go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favour, and is not the thing he was.

From the Twentieth Essay, 'Of Counsel,' also published in 1612, we extract a small portion at the close :

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It is in vain for princes to take counsel concerning matters, if they take no counsel likewise concerning persons; for all matters are as dead images, and the life of the execution of affairs resteth in the good choice of persons. In choice of committees for ripening business for the council, it is better to choose indifferent persons than to make an indifferency by putting in those that are strong on both sides. I commend, also, standing commissions-as for trade, for treasure, for war, for suits, for some provinces; for where there be divers particular councils, and but one council of estate (as it is in Spain), they are in effect no more than standing commissions, save that they have greater authority. Let such as are to inform councils out of their particular professions (as lawyers, seamen, mintmen, and the like), be first heard before committees, and then, as occasion serves, before the council. And let them not come in multitudes or in a tribunitious manner, for that is to clamour councils, not to inform them. A long table, and a square table, or seats about the walls, seem things of form, but are things of substance; for at a long table, a few at the upper end in effect sway all the business, but in the other form there is more use of the counsellors' opinions that sit lower. A king, when he presides in council, let him beware how he opens his own inclination too much in that which he propoundeth, for else counsellors will but take the wind of him, and, instead of giving free counsel, will sing him a song of 'Placebo.'*

The Twenty-first, entitled 'Of Delays,' first published in 1625, is very short: it concludes thus:

Generally it is good to commit the beginnings of all great actions to Argus with his hundred eyes, and the ends to Briareus with his hundred hands-first to watch and then to speed. For the helmet of Pluto, which maketh the politic man go invisible, is secrecy in the council, and celerity in the execution; for when things are once come to the execution, there is no secrecy comparable to celerity-like the motion of a bullet in the air, which flieth so swift as it outruns the eye.

The Twenty-second, 'Of Cunning,' published in 1612, begins as follows:

We take cunning for a sinister or crooked wisdom. And

* I will make myself agreeable.