We take pleasure in presenting in another part of the magazine a description of the methods of instruction pursued in the Columbia College Law School and a study of the comparative advantages of the "case" and "text-book" systems, giving both the official statement and comments from the standpoint of the students. The articles will, we trust, do much to refute the criticisms made by unfriendly critics, and quiet the doubts and apprehensions of those friends of the school whose old school training has prevented them from accepting the more radical methods now in force. It is really a matter of no little wonder that the introduction of the "new system," as it is called, should have excited so much opposition and criticism. The “change” was nothing more nor less than the application to the study of law of the modern scientific methods of work in the field of higher education. It was the substitution of the inductive for the deductive method of study in a subject eminently suited to such an application. It was a most forcible and important recognition of the fact that law is something more than a business, that it is a science of the highest order, and one which in its treatment requires the application of the most intelligent scientific methods. It was in the nature of a revelation to many of the fact that the proper training for the law student is not a superficial and cursory study of the broad principles of law, but rather a thorough and detailed investigation on the part of the student himself. The student does not accept the rendering of the law by certain text-book writers, but goes himself to the "original authorities "—the cases—and works out the principles as seen in their application under the direction and guidance of the professor. The student now studies the law in the manner in which he will be called upon to investigate a case when he comes to active practice. APPLETON VS. TAPLEY. ΟΝ } N July 3, 1892, one Walton, owner of a quantity of cotton, sent it to defendant, a commission merchant, for sale on commission. On August 10th, 1892, Walton sold the same to plaintiff; and two days later, defendant, having no knowledge or notice of the sale by Walton, sold and delivered the same to one Cutting, who converted it into cloth. Plaintiff thereafter demanded the goods of defendant, and on his refusal to deliver them, sues in Trover. Defendant pleads "Not Guilty" and "Not Possessed." The facts being undisputed, the learned trial judge directs a verdict for plaintiff, subject to the opinion of this court, and the case now comes on to be heard. C. N. DOHS, The statement gives no ground for charging negligence or bad faith upon plaintiff, nor does it appear that he had actual notice of defendant's possession. Again, there is nothing to show that defendant had any lien on the cotton, or any interest whatever in it. The case does not involve the consideration of any of these questions. The pleading put in issue both the possession of the plaintiff and the wrongful acts of the defendant. As to the first point, the plaintiff's right is clear. Walton had given no lien or special property beyond that involved in mere possession, and the power of sale conferred in defendant was coupled with no interest. Consequently, at the time of his sale to plaintiff, full title to the cotton was in Walton; and by that sale, although no delivery was made, full and unqualified title passed to plaintiff, together with the right to demand immediate possession from defendant. So far as possession in plaintiff is concerned, then there can be no question, and if, on August 11, 1892, a stranger had destroyed the cotton, the plaintiff's right against him in trover would be beyond dispute. It may be well to emphasize here the fact that in this case there is no question of equities. The conversion, if any, was a conversion of property of the plaintiff, and his rights against the defendant, if any, are original, and not rights sounding in tort or breach of contract of agency, derived by assignment from Walton. What passed by assignment was the cotton, and thus the plaintiff, as bona fide purchaser, gets free from equitable defenses and set-offs on the part of Walton and Walton's privies. As to the second point, it is admitted that the defendant exercised acts of ownership over the goods. That those acts, to wit, the sale to Cutting, were unauthorized by plaintiff, the then owner, and hence as to plaintiff, wrongful, becomes equally clear when the nature of defendant's authority to sell is considered. It was a merely personal authority, revocable at pleasure. As authority to pass title, it must necessarily cease when the principal's sale put that title in a stranger. As authority to make a physical transfer and delivery of the cotton in behalf of the principal, it must necessarily cease when the principal, by conveyance to a stranger, lost the right to perform those acts, either personally or by another. Between this case and the case of a so-called express revocation, the distinction is obvious. There is in this case an element of impossibility in the way of holding that the authority continues after the sale, for while, as against the principal or his estate, the acts of the unratified agent may be held valid, as against an innocent vendee, who never gave the authority and never became estopped, it would seem to be impossible. If the foregoing reasoning is correct, all the elements of a conversion are here present, and it remains only to consider whether, under the circumstances, defendant should not be excused from liability. Such excuse is possibly available to one who innocently, and at the request of one in custody of the goods, performs a merely immaterial act upon them, as, for instance, to the miller who grinds corn for a thief. But this excuse has not been extended to acts which purport" to involve a transfer of the supposed property in the goods" (Pollock on Torts, 2d Ed., pp. 293 and 294). It may be that the principle underlying this exception would excuse this defendant, and perhaps our sense of justice would approve such an application. Indeed the cases of Roach v. Tush, 9 Hersh (Tenn.), and Jones v. Hodgkins, 6 Maine, 480, 708, go the full length, and excuse a defendant under somewhat similar circumstances. But those cases seem to stand alone; and in view of the fact that the exception itself, whose principle we are asked to extenu, is by no means well established, it seems clear that no sufficient principle or authority exists to take the case out of the general rule, and accordingly the judgment of the court below is affirmed. The General Catalogue. R. S. ROUNDS. The Trustees have appointed a committee, consisting of Prof. Van Amringe, Secretary of the Faculty of Arts, and John B. Pine, Clerk of the Board, to prepare a new edition of the General Catalogue of Officers and Alumni, to be issued in 1894. The last edition, which was prepared by Prof. Van Amringe, contains a very full list of names of the alumni; but it is proposed, in the forthcoming edition, to include also the addresses of the alumni, their professions, their degrees, the colleges by which the same were conferred, and their titles, judicial, military, clerical or other. To secure this information will be a task of considerable magnitude, which cannot be accomplished without the assistance and co-operation of the alumni. It will, at least, be possible for every graduate who reads this to forward to the Committee his own name, with the name of the school from which he graduated, his class, present address, his degree and official title, if any. All communications should be addressed to Committee on the General Catalogue, Columbia College. RECENT LEGAL DECISIONS. Specific Performance of Contract. Time Essence of Contract. Laches.—A clause in a contract for sale of land to the effect that if the title is found to be defective, then, unless the material defects are cured within sixty days, the earnest money shall be refunded, and the contract become inoperative, does not prevent the purchaser, in case the title proves defective and the defects are not cured, from suing for specific performance by a conveyance of the defective title with compensation to him for the defects. A delay of two years in bringing suit for specific performance of a contract which makes time of the essence of the contract does not constitute laches, where the purchaser has been induced to postpone action by the vendor's promises, from time to time to cure the defects in the title.—Lancaster et al. vs. Roberts et al. Decided Jan. 19, 1893, Supreme Ct. of Illinois. Promissory Note. Corporation.-A note which recites that "We promise to pay," and is signed “M. N., President World's Pastime Exposition Co.; A. D., Treas.," is prima facie the individual note of M. N. and A. D.-McNeil et al. vs. Scholer & Carqueville Lithographing Co. Decided Jan. 19, 1893, Supreme Ct., Ill. Resulting Trust. Husband and Wife. Advancement. Presumption.-Complainant agreed to buy certain land and took abstract and a purchase money mortgage to his lawyer for examination. In the mortgage the wife's name was put first, and complainant signed both the mortgage and the note it secured, writing his name each time after that of his wife. He then gave the lawyer a check for the residue of the purchase money and told him to go with the wife and close the matter. The lawyer did so, receiving the deed to the wife and filing it for record. Complainant afterwards spoke of the property as his wife's. Held, in a suit by complainant to establish a resulting trust in the land, that the facts did not rebut the presumption that complainant bought the land as an advancement for his wife.-Smith vs. Smith et al. Decided Jan. 19, 1893, Supreme Court of Illinois. Fudgment. Equitable Relief. Negligence. Attorney and Client -A court of equity will not relieve a defendant from a judgment at law obtained against him by default because of the failure of his attorney to file a plea for him.-Bardouski vs. Bardouski. Decided Jan. 19, 1893, Supreme Court of Ill. Descent and Distribution. Domicile. Conflict of Laws.-A resident of Missouri abandoned her home in that State, intending to become a resident of one of two cities in Illinois, and died before adopting any home at either place. Held, that for purpose of distribution of her estate her domicile was in Missouri. Notes and bonds belonging to one whose domicile is in Missouri, which at the time of the owner's death are temporarily in possession of a person in Illinois for safe-keeping are not in a legal sense property in Illinois within the meaning of Rev. St. 1874, c. 39, § 1, regulating the descent of property in this State. Choses in action belonging to an intestate are to be distributed according to the law of his domicile.-Cooper vs. Beers. Decided Nov. 2, 1892, Supreme Court of Illinois. Sale of Standing Timber. Statute of Frauds.-A sale of standing timber, whether or not the parties contemplate its immediate severance and removal by the vendee, is a contract concerning an interest in lands within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds, and is voidable by either party if not in writing.-Decided Supreme Court of Ohio, Jan. 24, 1893. Will. Nature of Estate.—A will recited : "I devise to my wife the farm during her life, and at her death I devise it to J. and his heirs; and, if J. should die without issue, then one-third to descend to his wife and the remainder to my children." J. died before testator, leaving a wife and no issue, after which the testator and his wife died. Held, that the widow of J. took a fee in one-third of the farm, since to construe the will as a rule of descent instead of a devise would, when applied to the contingent remainder bestowed on the children, be contrary to the plain words of the devise, and when applied to the possession to J.'s wife, would create a partial intestary as to one-third of the farm, which the law will not presume was the intention of the testator.—Decided Jan. 27, 1893, Supreme Court of Indiana. Carriers. Injury to Postal Clerk. Who are Passengers.-A United States railway postal clerk, who has finished his regular run, and is on a train returning home riding free on the strength of his photograph commission in accordance with the custom of the railroad company under its contract to carry mails, is a passenger, and entitled to damages resulting from the negligence of the railroad's employees, whether he is riding in a passenger car or is in the postal car assisting his fellow-clerks in handling the mails.-Cleveland, C., C. & St. L Ry. Co. vs. Ketcham. Decided Jan. 26, 1893, Supreme Court of Indiana. Eminent Domain. Damages. Estoppel.-When a person who owns a fee in a street consents to the appropriation by a railroad company for a right of way, he is not thereby estopped from afterwards claiming damages for injury to the property thus appropriated, and for a depression in value of his abutting property caused by the construction and operation of such road.—Evansville R. R. Co. vs. Charlton. Decided Appellate Court of Indiana, Jan. 18, 1893. City Employee. Discharge. Abandonment of Service. Question for Fury.Where the Commissioner of Public Works, with power to discharge assistant engineers, notifies one that he is suspended, thereby intending to discharge him, and the engineer, without objection or protest, accepts other employment from |