tion, in his eyes, is primarily a work of Wisdom: 14 of that Wisdom which wills the salvation of the elect,15 and which foreknows 16 and prepares the infallible means by which it will be accomplished.17

...

14 Tanquerey thus defines the Wisdom of God: "Sapientia significat vel notitiam rerum per altissimas causas, vel rerum ordinationem qua agens finem intendit bonum eumque assequitur per media optima. Sapientia igitur supponit scientiam, quae perfecte cognoscit quid sit bonum, quid melius, et quae sint optima ad finem assequendum media; supponit voluntatem, quae fertur in bonum, necnon potentiam, cum in rebus agendis versetur" (op. cit. II 476). Cayré, after discussing the thought of A. on predestination, speaks thus of wisdom: "Thus understood, wisdom could be identified with God Himself, and St. Augustine often means by this word, sometimes the divine nature or some one of Its attributes, sometimes a divine Person, and especially the Second . . . but this spirit is considered in act, and since it is a question of the supreme Truth, this act could only be perfect, accompanied by a Love equally perfect, sovereignly beatifying. There is the ideal wisdom in all the force of the term, and the rule of all created participation. . . . It is in fact in the Christian that the most perfect participation of the wisdom of God finds itself, possible here below, thanks to faith, which in spite of its obscurities, reveals to him the supreme truth, and thanks to charity which unites him to God so profoundly; thanks also to hope which gives him the certitude of possessing it fully in heaven one day. Here is Christian wisdom" (ATh 2.61). Cayré further remarks (ibid. 62 n.1) that this Christian wisdom is the wisdom most characteristic of Augustinism. For a summary of the various meanings A. intends by the word "wisdom," see pp. 276-281 infra. 15 The idea of the will of God is predominant in considering the role of wisdom as ordering the participation in God by His creatures—through providence in the world of bodies, through predestination in the world of spirits. Cf. Cayré, ATh 2.31, 37. Predestination, considered as a work of Wisdom puts it into relief as a work of love, love of good which directs the soul toward God and through faith advances to perfect love of God (it is grace which produces this) ibid. 38. The soul in this movement toward God as its final end recognizes God as its sovereign good and calls forth a love capable of drawing the will toward Him in spite of resistance. This is the moral aspect of the problem as A. sees it (Cayré, ATh 2.57 f.). 10 When A. considers predestination as connected with God's foreknowledge, he speaks of the foreknowledge of the gifts, graces very real and determined, which God prepares for men, rather than foreknowledge of merits. A. constantly recurs to this foreknowledge (e. g. persev. 35), which directs and assures the infallible results of predestination.

17 Cayré notes that there is a further advantage in considering predestination from this point of view, namely, that Wisdom rules the means, especially the use of intermediaries, as well as decides the ends: man is

Furthermore, because Augustine's outlook was focused by his gaze on the divine attributes, he was not so much concerned with the "why" or the "how" of the mystery-which problems absorb man's attention as soon as he allows himself to be bound by the confines of what his own limited powers can comprehend—but by the reality of the mystery which assures that God's will is being done and that man's is dependent upon Him.

In setting forth the predestination of the saints as a proof of the gratuity of grace, Augustine wrote, not as a theologian, pondering the abstract features of the dogma, nor even as an exegete, but rather as "an apologist of the rights of God," 18 and as a bishop and pastor of a flock whom he would protect from false doctrines. As such, he sets forth these concrete facts,19 based mainly on proofs from Holy Scripture: some will be saved, some, lost; those who are saved owe their salvation to the goodness of God, 20 Who from all eternity has foreknown and prepared for them the gift of eternal life 21 and the efficacious means of obtaining it. "He wills that they shall accomplish the meritorious works which are the condition of gaining heaven, although they are not the condition of the divine choice. . ."; 22 those who are lost undergo a condemnation which is meted out by the infinite justice of God.28

sanctified by the aid of his fellow men; the Church itself exists for man's sanctification (ATh 2.39).

18 Cayré, ATh 2.56.

19 A. takes "a real or historical point of view founded on the data of revelation. It should also be remarked that Augustine studies predestination in concreto, together with all the graces it supposes, from the first movement of grace until the attainment of glory . . ." (Cayré, Patrology I 690 n. 3).

20 Persev. 16.

"Even in considering the preparation of the city of the elect, which view enters the order of intention, the fact itself is uppermost in the mind of A. He keeps in mind "the intention relative to that real order in which we exist and live, that intention which is de facto manifested by events which really take place, and which one day will be wholly revealed in heaven" (Cayré, Patrology I 690 f.).

22 Cayré, ibid. 689.

28 Cf. persev. 16, 18. Only the elect who are called secundum propositum Dei will be saved. The rest, who are simply called (vocati) will be excluded from eternal happiness in heaven because of their sins; this

The gratuity of predestination to the gift of final perseverance, which gift is given to the elect that they may obtain the glory foreseen and prepared for them, is proved from the fact that they ask God for this gift in prayer-prayer being both a necessary condition laid down by God for man's obtaining this gift," and likewise a comforting assurance to souls to live in hope that since.

shows forth the justice of God, as His saving the elect shows His mercy. "... the grace of God is given not according to the merits of those who receive it, but according to the pleasure of His will. . . . But even if He does not give, He is just, and He does not give to those to whom He does not wish to give. . . . By not giving to all, He shows what all deserve. He is good in His favor to some, just in His punishment of the rest; He is good in respect to all, since it is good when a debt is paid; and He is just in respect to all, since it is a manifestation of justice when what is not due is granted without injury to anyone" (persev. 28). The wicked are punished per iudicium (enchir. 24.95), "which supposes a real guilt. Here Saint Augustine brings in orginial sin, which enfolds all mankind in sin, and thus explains, by the real, although not always personal fault, the abandonment of those who are not saved, even children: they come under judgment. He went too far when he affirmed that these children, on account of orginal sin alone, are condemned to the torment [cf. Commentary infra pp. 253 f.], although it is of the lightest nature, but his insistence on original sin shows that reprobation, unlike predestination, is not gratuitous, and in consequence, although the situation of the elect and the damned is in some ways identical, for instance in the sense that they were both equally distant from God, it is not so from every point of view. The elect are the object of infinite mercy, which God vouchsafes to whom He wills" (Cayré, Patrology I 691). And Tanquerey (Synopsis II 531) hastens to the defense of A. against the Jansenists and Protestants, who claim that he denied that God wills the salvation of all, by calling attention to the following passages: "A quo interitu, hoc est poenis sempiternis, Deus misericors volens homines liberare, si sibi ipsi non sint inimici, et non resistant misericordiae Creatoris sui, misit Unigenitum suum" (catech. rud. 26.52) and: "Vult autem Deus omnes homines salvos fieri et in agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes, iustissime iudicantur" (spir. et litt. 58). Cayré remarks that the apparent contradictions which occur in the writings of A. concerning the salvation of all "disappear when it is noted that Augustine admitted, in addition to the consequent will which he treated directly, a real antecedent will of God, favourable to the salvation of all, but too engrossed in his ordinary way of envisaging the subject he failed to stress it sufficiently " (Cayré, Patrology I 692).

24 Persev. 15.

they pray that itself being a gift from God-they are among those predestined.25 Predestination, because it is a truth, should be preached to the faithful, but in such a way that they are encouraged to continue trustfully both their own efforts as well as their reliance upon God's grace.20

It is well to recall that the doctrine of grace and predestination as presented by St. Augustine is basically contained in his treatise to Simplician 27 and remained unchanged throughout his writings which followed, inclusive of his De dono perseverantiae. In fact, there is in the De dono perseverantiae a climactic recapitulation of these teachings on predestination as contained in his previous writings, 28 as well as of the aspects of the doctrine of grace which he emphasized, namely, its necessity and its gratuity.29

III. DATE AND TITLE OF THE DE DONO
PERSEVERANTIAE

A terminus a quo for the De dono perseverantiae can be established from a statement which St. Augustine made in the De praedestinatione sanctorum to the effect that he had finished two books of the Retractationes before considering the letters of Prosper and Hilary. Since the Retractationes seem to have been finished ca. 427,2 the earliest possible date for the De dono perseverantiae would be 427.

Dating this work depends even more upon the possibility of dating the accession to the episcopate of Hilary of Arles. Prosper, in his letter to Augustine, mentions Hilary as one of those disturbed by Augustine's teaching on predestination; and he does not, as Tillemont observed, speak of Hilary's being bishop as an event unknown to Augustine.

25 Ibid. 57, 62, 64.

26 Ibid. 62.

27 See 3 f. supra where this matter is discussed.

29 See Commentary passim.

29 Ibid.

1 Praed. sanct. 7.

2

* Schanz-Hosius-Krueger IV 2.408; Bardenhewer IV 477.

* Goldbacher, op. cit. 58.60f., dates this letter in 429.

Tillemont, op. cit. XII 680 f. n. 10.

Now, Hilary succeeded Honoratus," the date of whose death was January 14 or 15, in 428 or 429. Hilary, then, became Bishop of Arles no earlier than 428, no later than 429. Sometime after this event, Prosper wrote to Augustine. Augustine's answer, the De praedestinatione sanctorum and the De dono perseverantiae, could not have been begun before 428.8

The terminus ad quem is definitely 430, the year of Augustine's death. Yet, as Tillemont further observed, it seems hardly possible that Augustine would have been able to compose such important and such beautiful works on such difficult matter, namely, the De praedestinatione sanctorum and the De dono perseverantiae, when the siege of the Vandals was in progress. Furthermore, during this same period, Augustine was working on the De haeresibus, a rather lengthy treatise dealing with eighty-eight heresies, and the Contra secundam Iuliani responsionem imperfectum opus.

9

There is question of a Eulalius, mentioned in the diptychs of the Church of Arles, who may have been elected to the bishopric after Patroclus (died 426) between Patroclus and Honoratus, who is commonly accepted as the successor of Patroclus. This would make the date of Honoratus' accession to the bishopric later (Tillemont, ibid.).

• Tillemont, ibid.; H. Lietzmann, RE 8.2.2276; the date of Honoratus' death is given as 429 in Gallia Christiana I (Paris 1870) col. 528, in P. Gams, Series episcoporum (Ratisbon 1873) 493, in L. Duchesne, Fastes episcopaux de l'ancienne Gaule I (Paris 1894) 249, and in Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina (Brussels 1898-1899) s. v. Honoratus. The problem of fixing with certainty the year of Honoratus' death arises from the fact that different interpretations are put upon a statement made in a life of Hilary that Honoratus was bishop two years, some believing that he completed two full years, others, that he only began the second year (Tillemont, op. cit. XII 484, 680). The year 426 is given as the date of Honoratus' accession to the episcopate in Acta Sanctorum Januarii II 380. The editors prefer the term biennio to triennio, recognizing still another problem involved in this expression of St. Hilary in his life of Honoratus (Acta Sanctorum Maii II 28).

The year 429 is given in Acta Sanctorum Maii II 24 f., in Gams, op. cit. 493, by Duchesne, op. cit. 249, and by Lietzmann, RE 8.2.1604; the year 429/430 is given in Gallia Christiana I 529.

8

Hilary had not yet seen a copy of A.'s Retractationes when he wrote to A. (Ep. 226.10). It would seem strange for a disciple of A. not to have known about this work by the end of 429 (Tillemont, op. cit. XII 682). Tillemont, op. cit. XII 681.