 But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I...  English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy - Page 137by James Seth - 1912 - 372 pagesFull view - About this book
 | George Berkeley - 1926 - 358 pages
...excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. II. Mind — spirit — soul. — But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...there is likewise something which knows or perceives mem, and exercises "3 divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving,... | |
 | Joseph Evans - 1928 - 352 pages
...operations of the mind ; or, lastly, ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination. . . . But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or myself. . . . That neither our thoughts nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the... | |
 | George Berkeley - 1928 - 168 pages
...are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there isjikewjse something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining,... | |
 | Herbert Ernest Cushman - 1919 - 452 pages
...En^htenme,nt» rrrJhe _assumption of the independence_of the.indisidual soul. " But besides all the endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something that knows or perceives them — what I call mind, spirit, soul, or self. By which I do not denote... | |
 | Arthur C. Danto - 1973 - 248 pages
...indeed in the image of God. 7 George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, n. 8 'But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing,... | |
 | Carl Avren Levenson, Jonathan Westphal - 1994 - 218 pages
...are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 2. But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or my self. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them,... | |
 | Galen Strawson - 1994 - 368 pages
...which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations . . . about them. This perceiving acting being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself....thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist" (Principles, section 2). Berkeley, then, is an immaterialist, and he is an idealist with respect to... | |
 | Robert G. Muehlmann - 2010 - 281 pages
...by various passages in the Principles. For example, Berkeley tells us that a spirit or mind is not "any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they 1. Jaakko Hintikka, "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?" in Descartes, ed. Willis Doney (New... | |
 | Y. Masih - 1999 - 606 pages
...apple; other collections of idea constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things. "But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...something which knows or perceives them, and exercises diverse operations, — as willing, imagining, remembering, — about them. This perceiving, active... | |
 | Margaret Atherton - 1999 - 288 pages
...passions of love, hatred, joy, grief and so forth." In the next section, ideas are contrasted to that which "knows or perceives them and exercises divers...operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them." That which knows is not an idea. No, Berkeley insists, it is "a thing entirely distinct from them,... | |
| |
