Mathematical models of distribution channels

Print version:

Cover

Contents

Preface

1 In the Beginning

2 Toward a Unifying Theory of Distribution Channels

3 Channel Myths and Distribution-Channels Modeling

4 Academic Study

1 A Commentary on Distribution-Channels Modeling

1 Introduction

2 Channel Myths

3 Our Fundamental Assumptions

4 Our Plan for the Monograph

5 Introductory Commentary

6 Appendix

2 The Bilateral-Monopoly Model and Channel Myths

1 Introduction

2 The Bilateral-Monopoly Model: The Early Literature

3 The Bilateral-Monopoly Model: Formal Analyses

4 Key Channel Myths Illustrated

5 Commentary

Channels without Competition

3 Multiple (Exclusive) Retailers

1 Introduction

2 The Vertically-Integrated System

3 Channel Coordination with Independent Retailers

4 Manufacturer Profit-Maximization with Independent Retailers

5 Commentary

6 Appendix

4 Multiple (Exclusive) States-of-Nature

1 Introduction

2 Assumptions of the Model

3 The Vertically-Integrated System

4 An Independent Retailer

5 The Channel-Coordinating Tariffs

6 The Stackelberg Tariffs

7 Coordination vs. Maximization

8 Commentary

Channels with Competition

5 Toward a Manufacturer-Optimal Per-Unit Fee: A Channel-Coordinating Quantity-Discount Schedule

1 Introduction

2 The Model's Assumptions

3 The Vertically-Integrated System

4 Independent Retailers and a Quantity-Discount Schedule

5 Independent Retailers and a Two-Part Tariff

6 Comparing the Various Tariffs

7 The Manufacturer's Profit under the Alternative Tariffs

8 The Quantity-Discount Schedule and Retailer Profit-Extraction

9 Commentary

10 Appendix

6 The Manufacturer-Optimal Two-Part Tariff

1 Introduction

2 Optimal Per-Unit Prices and Fixed Fees: The Basics

3 Ensuring Participation with an Optimal Per-Unit Wholesale Price and Fixed Fee

4 Alternative Two-Part Tariffs: Comparisons

5 The Sophisticated Stackelberg Tariff and Retailer Profit-Extraction

6 Commentary

7 Appendix

7 The Channel-Coordinating Menu

1 Introduction

2 The Retailers' Response to a Menu of Two-Part Tariffs

3 The Manufacturer's Decisions on the Fixed Fees

4 A Numerical Illustration

5 The Channel-Coordinating Menu and Retailer Profit- Extraction

6 Commentary

8 Coordination versus Maximization: Theoretical Analyses

1 Introduction

2 The Three Wholesale-Price Policies

3 The Manufacturer's Choice of an Optimal Wholesale-Price Strategy: Theoretical Foundations

4 The Manufacturer's Choice of an Optimal Wholesale-Price Strategy: Theoretical Extensions

5 The Manufacturer's Choice of an Optimal Wholesale-Price Strategy: Numerical Illustrations

6 Commentary

7Appendix

9 Coordination versus Maximization: Graphical Analyses

1 Introduction

2 Background Assumptions

3 Manufacturer Profitability: The Quantity-Discount Schedule vs. the Sophisticated Stackelberg Tariff

4 Manufacturer Profitability: The Quantity-Discount Schedule vs. the Menu of Two-Part Tariffs

5 Manufacturer Profitability: The Sophisticated Stackelberg Tariff vs. the Menu of Two-Part Tariffs